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We study the employment and distributional effects of regulating 
(reducing) working time in a general equilibrium model with search­
matching frictions. Job creation entails some fixed costs, but existing 
jobs are subject to diminishing returns. We characterize the equilibrium 
in the de-regulated economy where large firms and individual workers 
freely negotiate wages and hours. Then, we consider the effects of a 
legislation restricting the maximum working time, while we let wages re­
spond endogenously. In general, this regulation benefits workers, both 
unemployed and employed (even if wages decrease), but reduces prof­
its and output. Employment effects are sensitive to the representation of 
preferences. In ourbenchmark, small reductions in working time, starting 
from the laissez-faire equilibrium solution, always increase employment, 
while larger reductions reduce employment. However, the employment 
gains from reducing working time are relatively small.
JEL Classification: E24, E25, J22. J23, .130, ,141.
Keywords: Hours reduction; Leisure; Search; Unemployment; Wage; 






















































































































































































The policy of reducing working time with the declared aim of re­
ducing unemployment (work-sharing) has recently received renewed sup­
port in Continental Europe and is in the process of being implemented 
in some countries (i.e., the 1998 Aubry’s Law in France and the 1998 
Italian’s Government approval of the 35 hours, vet to be legislated). A 
major appeal of such policy -  which has some recent precedents in the 
80’s in Germany and France -  lies in its implicit promise of enhancing 
employment without harming the interests of workers, in contrast with 
other proposed “labor market liberalization” policies.
Similarly to a large number of historical episodes of debate on work­
ing time regulation (stretching back to at least the X I X th Century move­
ment for the 10 hours a day), this issue is a source of conflict between 
workers’ and employers’ organizations, the former supporting and the lat­
ter opposing to the regulation. Critics have pointed out that, by creating 
further market frictions and rigidities, these policies might not only re­
duce output, but also employment. A major argument is that since there 
are important fixed cost associated with the process of hiring and train­
ing new workers, the work-sharing policy will increase unit labor costs 
and reduce job creation. Many authors question the same rationality 
of the work-sharing policy from the point of view of its proponents, by 
arguing that both workers and firms will loose from the introduction of 
regulation which tightens contractual rigidities. According to this view, 
the call for working time reduction has its roots in a sort of irrational 
ideologism.
In this paper, we develop a general equilibrium model where un­
employment originates from search-matching frictions, to address two 
questions: i) What are the employment effects of a legislation reduc­
ing working time? ii) Is the call for working time reduction rational 
from the point of view of its proponents? or, alternatively, i i ’) What 
are the distributional effects of a policy reducing working time? In our 
model, diminishing returns to labor input makes work-sharing possible, 



























































































vacancies, plays against the effectiveness of such policy. We analyze, as 
benchmark, the case in which firms and workers freely negotiate wages 
and hours. Then, we consider the effects of a legislation restricting the 
maximum working time, while letting freely negotiated wages respond 
endogenously. Our main finding is that (some degree of) regulation re­
stricting working time benefits workers, both unemployed and employed, 
but reduces profits and output. The reason is that the workers’ bar­
gaining power is increased by the commitment granted by the law to 
have a number of hours which is lower than that which would emerge 
from the free negotiation. Although the bargaining process give in the 
presence of regulation - a socially inefficient outcome, the distributional 
gains for the workers more than outweigh the efficiency loss. Employ­
ment effects are, however, sensitive to how workers value consumption 
and leisure which, in turn, determines how wages respond to working 
time reductions. For a general class of preferences, small reductions in 
working time, starting from the laissez-faire equilibrium solution, always 
increase employment, while larger reductions reduce employment. How­
ever, the employment gains from reducing working time are relatively 
small. With alternative specifications of preferences (Constant Elastic­
ity of Substitution between consumption and leisure) employment effects 
might even be negative with “reasonable parameters". Finally, we show 
that work-sharing can only work as an employment policy if firms have 
some fixed factor of production. If capital and labor are the only fac­
tors, and capital can freely adjust (small open economy), for instance, 
restricting working time unambiguously reduces employment.
The quantitative predictions of the benchmark model are consistent 






























































































The persistence of high unemployment, levels in most Western European 
countries is unanimously perceived as a problem. There is, however, 
much less agreement on which polices should be pursued. Economic the­
ory suggests that certain policies can enhance employment. for instance, 
reducing unemployment benefits and minimum wages, reducing job pro­
tection, curbing union’s bargaining power by reforming the legislation on 
collective agreements, lowering pay-roll taxes, etc. The fact that these 
policies have not been widely implemented in Continental Europe does 
not necessarily reflect a lack of understanding of their effectiveness in 
making labor markets more efficient. These employment policies have 
redistributional effects and there may be unfeasible, or credible, ways of 
compensating the losing parties. It is just a sign of rational behavior 
that some of these liberalization policies would be opposed by the social 
groups expecting to lose. In particular, there is a widespread notion that 
firms have much to gain from operating in more flexible labor markets, 
whereas workers might in fact be hurt not only in relative, but also in 
absolute terms.
In this context, it is not surprising that the proposal of reducing 
unemployment through work-sharing is, on the one hand, fairly popular 
with the general public, but, on the other hand, perceived as almost ir­
rational by many economists and some interested parties. The appeal of 
this proposal lies in its “solidarity” approach, and its promise to reduce 
unemployment without touching the Welfare State nor, possibly, reduc­
ing workers’ welfare. Many economists argue, however, that by imposing 
further restrictions to the set of contractual relationships, this policy 
may only induce further inefficiencies and possibly worsen the European 
unemployment problem.1
'For example, Saint-Paul (1999) just captures the opinion of many economists 
when he argues that “part of the popularity of this recipe hinges on utopia (a free 
lunchi. misunderstanding and ideology... I f  it is the case that people want to work 
shorter hours because they consider that the workweek is too long given the hourly 
wage, that is. they would prefer to work less in exchange for an equiproportionate 




























































































The objective of this paper is to address the following questions, 
through a careful analysis based on economic theory: i) What are the 
employment effects of a legislation reducing working time? ii) Is the 
call for working time reduction rational from the point of view of its 
proponents? or, alternatively, i i ') What are the redistributional effects 
of a policy reducing working time? For this purpose, we construct a 
general equilibrium model of an imperfectly competitive labor market 
which we regard as an appropriate tool for answering these questions.
Concerning the first question, (i), our analysis provides little ground 
for optimism. While we show that -  as it is argued by the proponents 
- regulating (restricting) the number of working hours may have posi­
tive effects on employment, our quantitative analysis suggests that these 
effects are, at best, very small. The major effect of reducing working 
hours is a decrease in output and total number of hours worked. Our 
predictions are in line with the existing empirical evidence for experi­
ments of working time reduction in Germany in the 1980’s (see section 
2). As concerns the second question, (ii), however, we show that the 
call for working time reduction, today as in the past, since the beginning 
of the Industrial Revolution (see, again, section 2), does not necessarily 
arise from any irrational ideologism. Rather, we find that workers gener­
ally prefer the maximum number of hours to be regulated by law, rather 
than be determined by unfettered agreements between workers and firms. 
The redistributional effects of such a policy does not only favor the un­
employed but, in general, also favor the employed. In fact, the difference 
between the workers’ most preferred regulation and the laissez-faire equi­
librium outcome is quite large, even though workers anticipate the wage 
reduction associated with shorter working hours.
The main argument of the proponents of working time reduction is 
that this policy will induce firms to substitute some of the labor services 
provided by their current employees with new hirings. According to 
Dreze (1987, 1991), this substitution is also beneficial from the standpoint 
of social efficiency, as employers typically do not properly internalize the





























































































social effect of hiring a new worker and have an inefficient bias for asking 
current employees to work longer hours. The so-called ‘‘lump of work” 
argument has been widely criticized (see Calmfors. 1987. for instance). 
Some of the firm’s labor costs (screening, training, firing, etc.) are fixed 
per employee and independent of the number of hours worked and. thus, 
reducing working time tends to increase the costs of production, and 
reduce the incentive for firms to generate employment. Moreover, hourly 
wages are likely to rise, although wages per employee may fall, which 
may further discourage employment creation. Finally, firms may react 
by adjusting (reducing) capital rather than by increasing the number of 
employees.
The main forces stressed by advocates and opponents to the work­
sharing policy are present in our model. On the one hand, in the tradition 
of the search-matching literature, we introduce fixed costs in the form 
of vacancy creation costs associated with hiring new workers. Due to 
the existence of fixed costs, the simple “lump of work” argument does 
not apply. On the other hand, we assume diminishing returns to labor, 
where labor input is measured by the total number of hours worked by the 
employees in a large firm (workers and hours are assumed to be perfect 
substitutes). Due to this feature of the model, the marginal product 
of labor increases, and firms have an incentive to post new vacancies, 
when firms face a reduction in the maximum hours of labor service per 
employee. Finally, we allow for an endogenous wage adjustment through 
a standard bargaining procedure. The presence of forces with opposite 
signs makes the employment effects of reducing working time a priori 
ambiguous. Such ambiguity, together with the fact that wage adjust, 
makes the redistributional effects also a priori ambiguous.
Our benchmark will be laissez faire economies, where workers freely 
negotiate wages and hours of work with employers, in a standard Nash- 
bargaining fashion. Given the outcome of the negotiations, firms decide 
the number of vacancies to post, which will determine the inflow of work­
ers into employment. Separations occur at an exogenous rate, thus, each 
firm needs to continuously recruit new workers in order to keep employ­




























































































ronment. we study the behavior of alternative economies where working 
hours are determined by some exogenous regulation, and workers and 
firms only bargain for wages. We study the employment and welfare 
effects of the regulatory policies, by taking laissez-faire as the initial sit­
uation, and then introducing regulation which constrains the maximum 
number of working hours.
The first result of our model is that employers and employees have 
- endogenous - preferences on working time regulations resulting in a 
conflict of interests. In general, the employees prefer to restrict statutory 
hours below the laissez-faire solution, even if they anticipate their wage 
earnings to be cut. Firms will instead suffer losses from regulations re­
ducing working hours. The distributional effects of restricting working 
time are therefore clear-cut.
The second result is that the employment effects of regulations are 
ambiguous, and crucially depend on the response of wages. If hours were 
reduced keeping the total wage per employee constant, employment would 
unambiguously fall. However, changes of working hours cause endoge­
nous wage adjustments in our general equilibrium model, and the final 
effect on employment depends on the extent to which the enforcement 
of restrictions of working hours affect (i) the workers’ marginal utility of 
consumption; (ii) the marginal productivity of labor. Therefore, the net 
employment effect will depend on both technology and workers’ prefer­
ences for consumption and leisure.
While maintaining a standard Cobb-Douglas production technol­
ogy, we study different specifications of preferences. Our benchmark 
preferences (GHH), introduced in the real business cycle literature by 
Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huffman (1988), have the property that the 
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure is inde­
pendent of the consumption level within the period. In this case, we 
prove that the relationship between working time and employment is 
non-monotonic. Moreover, given a laissez-faire economy, there exists a 
range of reductions of hours which increases employment. In order to 
assess the quantitative importance of these results, we construct “cali­




























































































The findings are that employment tends to be higher in a labor-managed 
economy, where the government sets hours so as to maximize the work­
ers’ welfare, than in a pure laissez-faire economy. The difference in the 
number of hours worked is quite large: in a labor-managed economy, 
employees work about two thirds of the time they would work in a pure 
laissez-faire economy. The employment differences are, however, very 
small: the unemployment rate decreases by 0.9% at most. Accordingly, 
output and total hours worked are substantially lower in the labor man­
aged than in the laissez-faire economy. We also simulate the effects of a 
reduction from 40 to 35 hours. This policy increases the workers’ welfare, 
but has a negligible effect on employment, and a large negative effect on 
output.
We also study the case of CES preferences. In this case, when 
the workers’ leisure increases due to restrictions on working time, the 
marginal utility of consumption increases, too, and this makes workers 
more aggressive in the wage bargaining. Thus, in general, working time 
reductions cause a less pronounced fall in wage per employee and make 
favorable employment effects less likely. In particular, we show that the 
employment effects are always negative if the elasticity of substitution 
between consumption and leisure is less than one. Even when this oc­
curs, however, restrictions in working time tend to increase the workers’ 
welfare.
These results are obtained under the assumption of fixed capital. 
In contrast, employment effects of restricting working time are always 
negative, even with GHH preferences, if there are no fixed factors of 
production and capital can freely adjust.
Although we are, by no means, the first to analyze working time 
regulations from a positive or normative perspective, the theoretical lit­
erature is relatively limited. Most of the existing literature already cau­
tioned that government action in reducing working time may not result 
in a reduction of unemployment.2 The main value added of our approach 
can be summarized in the following points: (i) we provide a clear ratio­
2See Hart (1987), who summarizes the state of the art ten years ago, which has, 




























































































nale to the observation that workers often lobby for legislative restrictions 
of working time; (ii) in a rather transparent way, we trace back the pos­
sible employment effects to basic parameters: (Hi) we make the analysis 
in a simple dynamic general equilibrium model which can be suitably 
calibrated and solved numerically to obtain a quantitative assessment of 
the effects of policies. From a more theoretical perspective, we regard 
our work as a complement to the vast theoretical literature which has 
studied in the recent years a variety of labor market phenomena in the 
framework of search-matching models.
The following papers -  among others - have made valuable con­
tributions to the literature on the effects of regulation of working time. 
Calmfors (1985) studies how the reduction of working hours impacts 
on wages and employment in a static model where wages are set by a 
monopoly union. He finds that the employment effects of reducing work­
ing time are, in general, ambiguous, and that -  in a monopoly union 
model -  unions will never find it optimal to accept both a hour and a 
wage reduction in response to a negative supply shock. Booth and Sehi- 
antarelli (1987) extend the analysis of Calmfors (1985) and analyze the 
results under parametrized preferences. Their static model differs from 
ours in many dimensions, as does their conclusion that unions should 
not lobby for regulations of working time. Hoel (1986) shows that em­
ployment effects need not be positive even if hourly wages are assumed 
to remain constant when sectoral reallocation is allowed. Hoel and Vale 
(1986) find a negative relationship between working time and unemploy­
ment in a model where firms act as wage setters. The issue of an endoge­
nous response of overtime to a reduction of normal working time (which 
we analyze in an extension) is analyzed by Calmfors and Hoel (1988), 
whose conclusions are, once again, pessimistic about the employment 
effects of reducing working hours.
Formally closer to our model, but less developed in scope, Burdett 
(1979) and Pissarides (1990, ch.6) discuss the effect of working hours 
on employment in search-equilibrium models. The latter, in particular, 
provides a comparison between the Nash solution for hours and the case 




























































































latter case workers choose to work less hours. This feature is also of 
importance in our analysis.
Recently. Moselle (1996) shows how, in an efficiency wage model 
with fixed costs, the relation between a reduction in hours and employ­
ment is not monotone, i.e., small reductions may result in higher employ­
ment. but further reductions in higher unemployment. While this result 
agrees with ours, Moselle’s work diverge from our conclusions (besides 
being methodologically very different) by predicting that a reduction in 
hours increases the utility of a currently unemployed worker, but neces­
sarily makes the employed workers worse off. An extension of Moselle’s 
analysis to a matching, Nash-bargaining, model with moral hazard is pro­
vided by Rocheteau (1999). At high unemployment levels Rocheteau’s 
economy behave as Moselle’s efficiency wage model. At low levels of 
unemployment, however, employed workers’ share of the surplus is high 
enough as to make efficient wage considerations not binding. As it follows 
from our results, in the pure Nash-bargaining regime, with constant re­
turns to labor, reducing working time increases unemployment. Autume 
and Cahuc (1997) also consider Nash bargained wages with technologies 
where hours and employment may have different diminishing returns. 
When the elasticity of output respect to hours is lower than with re­
spect to employment, the productivity gains associated with reducing 
working time, may result in positive employment effects. Employment 
effects can also be positive when the output elasticity of hours is higher 
than the elasticity of employment and a reduction of working time re­
sults in a reduction of hourly wages. In a calibrated general equilibrium 
model, without search-matching frictions, Fitzgerald (1998) obtains large 
positive employment effects when workers are less than fully employed. 
In summary, these “contemporaneous” works differ from ours in their 
choices of technologies and, in some cases (e.g., Fitzgerald), in the pre­
dicted employment effects of reducing working time. More fundamen­
tally, however, they differ from ours in that they can not explain, as we 
do, why all workers -employed and unemployed- may support statutory 
working time reductions against employers, or how the employment ef­




























































































and leisure, as well as on other assumptions, such as capital mobility or 
the treatment of overtime.
We proceed as follows. In section 2, we report some motivating 
empirical evidence. In Section 3, we describe our model. In Section
3, we characterize equilibrium under our benchmark preferences, where 
consumption and leisure are separable, within the period. In Section
4, we extend the analysis to preferences exhibiting constant elasticity of 
substitution between consumption and leisure. In Section 5, we study 
two extension of our model: collective wage bargaining and overtime. 
Section 6 concludes.
2 A perspective on working tim e
There has been a secular trend towards the reduction in working time. 
Figure 1 reports Maddison’s (1991) estimates of the secular evolution of 
the average yearly number of hours of labor activity per worker, showing 
a significant decrease for all countries sampled. Although, these figures 
reflect, to a large extent, the result of institutional changes (e.g., increas­
ing female participation, the development of part-time work etc.), it is 
clear that working time has decreased substantially over the last 150 
years. In 1815, the working week in textile mills was 76 standard hours, 
with about 9-10 days off per year (Bienifield, 1972), and the working 
week was even longer in France (Rigudiat, 1996). In the middle of the 
19th Century, a law of 60 hours (from 6am to 6pm, six days a week) was 
passed in England under the pressure of the union movement, whereas 
the 60 hours legislation was only introduced, in France, in 1904. Con­
trary to what is commonly perceived, the legislation about working time 
is not an “European issue” . In fact, the US led the trend of working time 
reduction in the first half of this Century -  from 58 weekly hours in 1901 
to 42 weekly hours in 1948 (Owen, 1979, 1988) - and the regulation has 
for a long time been tighter in the New than in the Old Continent (the 
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It might be tempting to interpret this trend as simply the result of 
an increasing demand for leisure, which naturally accompanied technical 
progress improving living conditions. In a perfectly competitive econ­
omy, this trend of an increasing demand for leisure, whatever its source, 
should not give rise to conflicts between employers and employees, nor 
should it require government intervention. However, the history of re­
duction of working time is not the history of a smooth change in the set 
of contractual relationships prevailing on the labor market. Rather, it 
is the history of acrimonious industrial disputes, culminating in legisla­
tive interventions and/or direct agreements between workers and firms, 
where the outcome typically depended on the general political strength 
of the two parties in conflict. For instance, the French workers obtained, 
in 1848, an act of 60 hours, which was soon abolished as the fortune of 
the labor movement was reversed.
As in the past, the regulation of working time remains a conflicting 




























































































tions today arc the same as they were in the early days of the Industrial 
Revolution.3 There is, however, an important novelty in the current call 
for the 35-hour working week. What was a call for alleviating the poor 
conditions of the employed workers a century ago. in order to defend 
them from monopsonistic practices of the employers4 has, in the last 
decades, become a call for alleviating the European unemployment prob­
lem, for work sharing, i.e., a larger number of people being employed, 
each person working less.
It is not uncommon that trade unions argue in the political debate 
that working time should be reduced without any wage cut. and that this 
will benefit employment. It would not be surprising to find that workers 
would welcome such a free lunch (were it feasible). However, less radi­
cal and more realistic advocates of the regulation acknowledge that the 
reduction in working hours should entail a cut in the employees’ wages. 
When this condition is added, it is no longer clear whether the currently 
employed workers will gain from the policy change. Nevertheless, as re­
u n io n s  support worktime reduction in most European countries, and, in some 
cases, also in the US (see, for example, the general resolution of the Munich Congress 
of the European Trade Union Confederation of May 1979), although there are some 
exceptions (Sweden, for instance). Many political parties which receive the electoral 
support of the working-class are also, to various extents, in favor of work-sharing 
policies. Business and employee organizations, as well as center and right-wing parties 
are, instead, normally against this.
There are, of course, some partial exceptions. For example, there are many case 
studies where working time reductions correspond to better working arrangements 
(new shifts, etc. ) and the increases in productivity are welcomed by employers (see, for 
example, White, 1981, or the Conway Report, 1985).Similarly, Richardson and Rubin 
(1993) report some survey evidence about the experience of working week reduction 
for manual worker in the British engineering industry. There, the majority of the 
managers interviewed were optimistic and believed that labor costs would increase 
fairly moderately. Such managerial optimism seems, however, to be a relative rare 
event. Bienefeld's (1972) historical account shows that the employers have always 
opposed a fiercer resistance to reduce standard working time than to increase wages. 
This view is echoed by Hart (1984), who argue that unless in the package of measures 
accompanying reduction of working time there is clear room for improvements of 
productivity, employers typically oppose these measures.
JFor example, according to K. Marx, the reduction of working time was a necessary 




























































































cent EC surveys show (see Robbins. 1980. and Stewart and Swaffield. 
1997). a large share of workers -  especially blue-collar workers - would 
like to work less hours at the given hourly wage, while only a small share 
would like to work more hours.5 Interestingly, a significant proportion 
of the British workers who would like to work less hours state that they 
often work overtime.
Concerning the employment effects of shortening working hours, 
there is only a limited body of empirical work, and the results are rather 
mixed. A number of papers in the 1980’s estimated the elasticity of em­
ployment to working hours in different countries (De Regt, 1988: Wad- 
whani, 1987; Brunello, 1989) to range between 0.34 and 0.5. These esti­
mates would suggest that the effects of reducing working time could be 
rather large. However, as recently pointed by Hunt (1997), these figures 
should be treated with great caution, since they are obtained by looking 
at aggregate trends only, and may well capture the existence of common 
trends in the variables, rather than causal relationships.
More recent work on two episodes of reduction in working time in 
the 1980’s find significantly smaller employment effects. The case which 
has been studied in the greatest detail is Germany. Between 1985 and 
1989, under the pressure of the Metal Working Industry Union, Germany 
experienced a series of negotiated reductions in the average weekly hours 
to 37 hours, where unions accepted -  as a counterpart -  extended flexi­
bility in the organization of working time. Although some earlier studies 
based on surveys run by employers and unions found rather optimistic re­
sults with employment elasticities ranging between 0.4 and 0.75 (Bosch, 
1990), more recent careful microeconometric work by Hunt (1996, 1997)
5Stewart and Swaffield (1997) report that in 1991 one third of male manual workers 
in UK would prefer to work fewer hours at the prevailing wage than they do; they 
also estimate that, on average, desired hours per week are 4.3 hours lower than actual 
hours. Note that there are important differences between the attitudes of European 
and North American workers. Bell and Freeman (1994) report that while in Germany, 
like in Britain, there are more workers surveyed who would rather work less hours 
at the current hourly wage than workers who would rather do the opposite, in the 
United States this pattern is reversed. And the response of Canadian workers are 




























































































finds the employment effects to be substantially smaller. In response to 
one standard hour reduction employment rose by 0.3-0.7% (implying an 
employment elasticity of 0.1) while the total number of hours worked fell 
(by 2-3%). Interestingly, Hunt’s work also shows that, due to an increase 
in the hourly wage (in addition to the increase in leisure), workers as a 
group seem to have benefited from working time reduction reforms, while 
output seems to have decreased.
While reductions in working time in Germany did not receive any 
stimulus from the authorities, in France, it was the government which, in 
January 1982, introduced a generalized reduction of statutory working 
time to 39 hours, intended to be the first step towards 35 hours. The 
experiment raised substantial controversy, and was essentially abandoned 
shortly afterwards. Only survey evidence is available about this episode, 
and different sources report different results. A study by INSEE found 
relatively low employment effects, with elasticities (0.1-0.15) rather close 
to those estimated by Hunt (1997) for Germany. Cette and Taddei (1994) 
report more optimistic figures (with elasticities between 0.15-0.3).6
3 The m odel.
3.1 Set-up: technology  and preferences.
A unique consumption good is produced by a measure one of competitive 
firms. The production function for the representative firm, i , is:
Yi = A (N ,li)a Kl~a
6In the United Kingdom, the only European country with virtually no regulation 
of working time, two important industrial disputes exploded in 1979 and 1989, both 
involving manual engineering workers, where the workers’ main request was the re­
duction of the working week. The former started with the demand of 35 hours and 
ended with an agreement based on 39 hours. The latter led to a further cut in the 
working week to 37 hours. While the first episode had very marginal effects, since 
firms mainly replaced normal hours with overtime (Roche, 1996), some authors argue 





























































































where ,4 is a parameter, N, denotes the set of firm i's employees and I, 
is the hours worked by each employee. A', as a productive factor with 
which firm i is endowed, and can be interpreted as capital, as well as 
managerial talent, land, etc.. For most of our analysis, we will treat K, 
as a fixed factor which firm i is endowed with. In section 4.3 we will 
discuss how the results change when A', can be costlessly adjusted. We 
assume that all firms in the economy have an identical endowment of the 
fixed factor, i.e., A', =  K.  Then we will write the production function 
as:
Y, = A (N xl,)a ,
where A = A K l~a.
We normalize hours such that each worker has a unit time en­
dowment. Workers’ preferences are defined over consumption and leisure 
(1 —/). Throughout our analysis, we will assume that workers can neither 
save nor borrow, thus w will denote both the current wage and consump­
tion. We will denote by u (w, (1 — /)) the instantaneous utility function 
of a representative worker, and assume that the rate of time preferences 
is equal to the interest rate, r.
The labor market is characterized by search frictions. We assume a 
standard isoelastic constant returns to scale matching function, ™ = 9 ^  
where m  denotes matches, v denotes vacancies and 6 = ^ is the tightness 
of the labor market, u being the mass of unemployed agents.
3.2 B ellm an  equations.
We assume that a firm has to pay a flow cost of c units of output in order 
to hold an open vacancy. This, together with search frictions, makes 
labor adjustments costly for each firm. The presence of frictions turns 
the number of employed workers into a state variable for each firm.7 Jobs
7Hiring costs can be regarded as a proxy for a number of fixed costs which we do 
not explicitly model, like training costs, etc.. The main difference is that these other 
costs are normally paid by firms after a worker is hired. We believe that extending 




























































































are terminated at the exogenous rate s. Then, the net flow of employment 
into firm i is given by:
N, = 9~A\ -  sN, (1)
where \ \  denotes the number of vacancies, and 9 is the tightness of the 
labor market (so, 9~a is the rate at which firms fill vacancies).
Each firm chooses the sequence! Ar, t, Ur}jlo so 85 t0 maximize the 
PDV of expected profits (cfr. Pissarides, 1990, ch.2), i.e.:
n, =  / 0°° e~rt (.4 (N .l .r  -  wNi -  cVi)dt =
=  / 0°° e~rt (.4 (Njli)a -  wNi -  c6< (TV, +  sNt) ) dt.
( 2 )
subject to (1) and given No- The optimality condition for N, requires 
that:
— w — c s d ( e ~ rtc9‘:) = 0. (3)
We will restrict attention to steady-state equilibrium. In steady-state, 9 
is constant, hence ^  (e~r,c8':) =  e^rtrc91' . Using the fact that all firms 
are equal and the total measure of firms is one (i.e., N, = n), we can 
write the resulting steady-state labor demand condition as
,4 (Arj/j)
Ni
pi — w — c(r + sjd1' = 0, (4)
where, p, the marginal product of labor is defined as:
p = aA(nl)°‘~1, (5)
and decreases with the total labor input (nl) in the firm. We assume 
that since the number of firms in the economy is large, each firm take
paper.
Also, we implicitly assume that the hiring/training technology has the same capital 
intensity as the production activity. If one assumed, instead, that hiring technology is 
more labor-intensive than production technology, restrictions on working time would 
have the additional effect of increasing the importance of fixed costs. Employment 
effects would therefore tend to be less positive under this alternative assumption than 




























































































the tightness of the labor market, 6, as given. Furthermore, since we 
assume that each firm employs a large number of workers (i.e., K  is large), 
we ignore the impact of changes in the number of hours worked by the 
marginal employee on the marginal product of labor (thus, for instance, 
if we let lj denote the hours worked by the marginal worker j ,  the revenue 
generated by this worker will be plj).
Denote by J  the value of the marginal position filled by the firm. 
In a steady-state, J  must be such that:
(r + s)J  = pi -  w. (6)
Then, (4) can be re-expressed as follows:
r cJ  =  c, (7)
which says that the firm will open vacancies until the point where the 
cost of holding a vacant position, c, equals the expected value of a filled 
vacancy (note that 6~(' is the instantaneous probability that a vacancy 
gives rise to a match).
The value of employment to a worker is:
(r + s)VF =  u (w, (1 -  /)) +  sU, (8)
where U is the value of being unemployed. U, in turn, is given by:
rU = it(0 ,1) +  — U), (9)
where u (0, 1) is the instantaneous utility of an unemployed agent who 
earns no wage and does not work (w = l = 0). From (8) and (9) it follows 
that;
(r + s + O'-t) (W  - U )  = u (to, (1 -  l)) -  ii(0, 1). (10)
We assume that each worker bargains individually over his wage 
and (in some cases) over his hours with the firm he is matched with, and 




























































































bargaining is deferred to section 7.1. The Nash solution is given by the 
solution to the following program:
max (lV - U ) 3(J - V ) 1- 3, (11)
where 0  is the bargaining strength of the workers, and 1- is the value 
of a vacancy. Since firms have no restriction to the number of vacancies 
which they can open, V will be zero in equilibrium. The First Order 
Conditions, using (4)-(6)-(7) and (10). can be written as:
________ 0________ - 1 - /?
ù (w , (1 -  /)) — ù(0, 1) Uul (pi — w + cO) ' ( 12)
ti (w, (1 — /)) — u(0, 1) 1 (pl — w + cO)^’
which, jointly, imply that p =  yielding an implicit relationship be­
tween wages and hours worked.
We will also study the case where the number hours is fixed by legal 
regulation, and workers and firms only bargain on wages. In this case, the 
bargaining problem is equivalent to (11), except that the maximization 
is now defined over w only. The resulting First Order Condition is (12), 
with the restriction that l = lr, where lr denotes the statutory working 
time.
The model is closed by a steady-state flow condition. Steady-state 
employment is the level n which equates transition rates into and out of 




The laissez-faire equilibrium will be determined by equations (4)-
(5)-(12)-(13)-(14) the endogenous variables being n, 6, l,p, w. In contrast, 
when working time is determined by legislation, the equilibrium will be 
determined by equations (4), (5), (12) and (14), the endogenous variables 




























































































We will consider two classes of preferences. In section 4. we will 
consider a generalized version of Quasi-linear utility, which was first in­
troduced in the macro-RBC literature by Greenwood, Hercowitz and 
Huffman (1988), where consumption and leisure are additivelv separa­
ble within each period. This class of preferences (from now on, GHH 
preferences) is very convenient for our purposes, since it allow us to ana­
lytically obtain all major results.8 In section 5 we extend the analysis to 
preferences exhibiting Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) between 
consumption and leisure.
4 GHH Preferences
In this section, we parameterize preferences as follows:
where we assume that x > 1 and u > 1. The value of ~ corresponds to 
what is known in the literature as the intertemporal elasticity of substi­
tution in labor supply, while !~ -  is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. 
Note that in the risk-neutrality case (u = 1) they reduce to the Quasi- 
linear utility specification. In this particular case, utility is linear in 
consumption and we do not need to rely on the assumption that agents 
cannot save.9
8See Greenwood et al. (1988) for an RBC model of capacity utilization, and 
Correia et al. (1995) for an RBC model of a small open economy. A property of 
these preferences is that the choice of the number of hours supplied does not directly 
depend on the intertemporal consumption-saving decision. This property (i.e., the 
absence of intertemporal substitution in labor effort) has proved useful for explaining 
some business cycles regularity -  such as fluctuations of working hours, consumption 
and investments -  better than with the standard CES specification.
9 A drawback of GHH preferences is the prediction that technical progress -  which 
we do not explicitly introduce in our model -  induces workers to increase continuously 
the number of hours supplied. This contradicts the evidence of a secular trend towards 
a reduction in working time discussed in the Section 2. As Correia et al. (1995) 





























































































The restriction that v > 1 means that one is the upper bound to 
relative risk aversion. With relative risk aversion equal or larger than 
one, the outcome of the bargaining process always gives the workers 
their reservation utility. Since the only effect of risk aversion is to reduce 
the workers’ bargaining power, and we allow, as a limit case (i.e., when 
v —* oc), for unit relative risk aversion, this assumption entails no loss 
of generality.
4.1 Laissez-faire equilibrium
The First Order Conditions for the laissez-faire economy, (12)-(13), are:
3 1 - 3
—r ~ -------r  =  -i---------- 5- <16)v (w -  i /* )  p l ~ w  +  c0
(1 ~0)P  (17)
v (w — p l - w  + <#'
which, after rearranging terms, give the following laissez-faire (unre­
stricted) solutions:
/„ = P ^ T; (18)
wu = 7 K ^ *') P ' - 1 + 3cd (19)
where 7 =  [(1 — 3)v + /3] 1 < 1. Two features of ( 18)-( 19) are worth 
noting:
i. Working time only depends on the marginal product of labor and 
the disutility of labor (and not on the workers’ risk aversion nor
counterfactual feature. In particular, it must be assumed that as labor productivity 
grows, so does the value of not working (i.e., due to ongoing technical progress in 
home production). Formally, the modified utility function would be: u (u \  (1 -  /)) =
v (w — X , “ , where Af grows at the same rate of labor productivity. With this 





























































































on their bargaining strength). In particular, (18) implies that the 
marginal cost of foregone leisure equals the marginal product of 
labor. In other terms, given p, hours are set so as to maximize 
the size of the surplus, and the wage is used to split this surplus 
between workers and firms.
ii. Wages decrease with risk aversion. In particular, as u —> oc (unit 
RRA), then wu —» —, namely workers are paid their reservation 
wage, whereas, when v = 1 (risk neutrality) then wu = “  +
plus a share 0  of the surplus generated by the match.
To find employment, substitute the equilibrium values of lu and ivu 
as given by (18) and (19) into equation (4):
Next, substitute n and l as given by (14) and (18), respectively, into the 
expression of the marginal product of labor, (5):
Equations (20)-(21) jointly determine the equilibrium solution in the en­
dogenous variables p, 9. Once p and 6 are determined, (14) and (18) 
yield the equilibrium employment and hours. The system (20)-(21) iden­
tify two loci in the plane (p, 9) which are, respectively, positively and 
negatively sloped, and whose intersection yields the unique equilibrium, 
(Pu, 0U) - see Figure 2. Recall that, from (18), a higher p implies a higher 
l, whereas, from (14), a higher 9 implies a higher n. The comparative 
statics are standard. Unemployment, for instance, depends positively on 
0  and c, and negatively on v.































































































Figure 2: Laissez-faire equilibrium
4.2 E quilibrium  w ith  hours regulation.
We now characterize equilibrium when agents bargain on wages only, and 
hours are exogenous. The First Order Condition, (12), yields:
w =  7 (1 -0 )J -^ + 0 (p lr+ C 0 )  
X
( 22)
which can be substituted into (4) to obtain the following demand condi­
tion:
(1 -  (3-y) ^plr -  = c [/?79 + (r + s)0c] . (23)
Next, using sequentially (5) and (14) to eliminate p and n we obtain: 24
t(0, lr) =  (l-p'y) (^aA (s0c 1 4- l ) 1 ° - c  [p-y6 + (r + s)0c] = 0.
(24)
By totally differentiating -r(6,lr), we have that ^  ■ This ex­
pression can be used for studying the employment effect of a change in 




























































































then is positive (negative) if and only if T^(0,lr ) is positive (neg­
ative). The sign of Tir(0,lT) is, however, in general ambiguous. Some 
simple algebra establishes that
n A O J J ^ O ^ a p - l ? - 1 | o .  (25)
An interesting local result can then be established. Consider economies 
in the neighborhood of a laissez-faire equilibrium. For these economies. 
small reductions of working time increase employment. More formally, 
if we denote the equilibrium employment level as a function of statutory 
hours by n(Zr), the following Proposition holds.
P roposition  1 (A) If  a  < 1, then 3e > 0 such that: 0 < lu — ls < ( => 
n(ls) > n(lu). (B) If a = 1, then: 0 < Zu -  ls => n(ls) < n(lu).
Proof. By condition (25), < 0 Z*_1 >  ap. But, from (18), lu =  pW T.
Then, if a  <  1, in a neighborhood of lu, it must be that jg- <  0. Thus, by (14), 
n(ls) > n(lu) and (A) is proved. When a =  1, then T/r =  0 and changing hours 
has no first-order effects. However, it is easily checked that, if ls <  lu (ls >  Zu), then 
i f '  >  0 (%. <  0 /  Thus. (B) follows- QED
Proposition 1 establishes that, generically, the laissez-faire solution 
does not maximize employment. While, under laissez-faire. Z =  p*31, 
employment is maximized when Z =  (ap)*r > . The two conditions only 
coincide under constant returns to labor, while if returns to labor are 
diminishing, unfettered bargaining will yield overwork and underemploy­
ment.
The result of Proposition 1 is illustrated by Figure 3, which geo­
metrically represents the implicit function given by equation (24). When 
a < 1 (Case A), the laissez-faire solution (Zu) lies to the right of the 
employment maximizing working time. Note that the result has a local 
nature. While small reductions of working time increase employment, 
large reduction may have the opposite effects. Finally, when a  = 1, 
Z =  lu maximizes employment (Case B), and no regulation in working 




























































































Figure 3: Rationship between 0 (tightness of the labor market) and lr 
(hours). Case A: a  < 1. Case B: a  =  1.
A corollary establishes that restricting hours reduces total wages.
C orollary 2 Let a j s be as in Proposition 1, part (A). Then, w(ls) <
w(lv).
Proof. By (4), IV =  a A n Q~1l“ — c (r  +  s)0<'. Since ls <  lu and. by Proposition 
1, n { ls ) > n ( lu) (given that Q <  1), and this, in turn, implies that 0(ls) > 6 (lu)). 
then w (ls ) < w (lu). QED
We will now analyze the welfare implications of policies reducing 
statutory working time.
Proposition  3 If  a < 1, then 3e > 0 such that: 0 < /„ — /, < e =4- (i) 
W{1.) > W(L)-, (ii) U(l.) > U (Q  and (hi) 11(1,) < ri(Zu)
Proof. To establish (i) and (ii), observe that, since U (0, 1) =  0, from (8)-(9)- 
(10)-(22), and given that u(0,l)=0 :
W r  (r + s + 01_<>) 
r  +  0l~(
r ( r  + s + 01_<:) aAna~1la
and
r  (r + s +  0l~^) 
r +




























































































Consider, first, the direct effect of changes in lT on M and U (given 8 and n). 
The term 3 ^ a .4 n Q_1/Q — is a decreasing function of l if ap < /v_1 and this 
condition is always satisfied when lr <  lu. The term — (1 — ')*/ ) ~  is also a decreasing 
function of l (recall that 7 1 / <  1). Thus, all direct effects of increasing (decreasing) 
lr are negative (positive) on both II and U. Consider, next, the indirect effects. 
Both i r  and U are increasing with both 8 and n. Furthermore, by Proposition 1. 
both 8 and n are decreasing with lr in a left-hand neighborhood of Zu, provided that 
a <  1. Therefore, the indirect effects of increasing (decreasing) lT are also negative 
(positive) in this case. Parts (i) and (ii) of the Proposition are then established.
To establish (iii). write:
n  = -  {Ana~ll° - w -  cs8<) =
"r( ( ^ ' 'I )  ' ( - I ) - ” * )
First, consider the term A (lr) =  ^ .4nQ_1I“ — . From the definition of p.
A '(lr) =  0 <=> p  =  Thus. A '(lu) — 0. Second, the proof of the first
part of this Proposition establishes that the term — ^W — is increasing with lr.
Third, Proposition 1 establishes that 8 is decreasing with lT in a neighborhood of lu. 
Therefore, the term — CsŜ  is increasing with lr in that neighborhood. Finally, by 
the envelope theorem, =  0. Hence, part (iii) follows. QED
Proposition 3 establishes that, starting from a laissez-faire equi­
librium, all workers, both employed and unemployed, benefit from the 
reduction of working time when a  < 1. Firms lose, however. While 
the value of the marginal filled position (J) increases, the value of the 
firm (II), which also includes rents associated with the fixed factor K  is 
reduced.
So far, we have discussed the employment and distributional effect 
of working time regulation. It seems natural to ask what the effects on 
efficiency are. Answering this question is relatively simple, when agents’ 
preferences are linear in income (y =  1). In this case, the planner chooses 
the allocation which maximizes the present discounted value of aggregate 




























































































creation costs. This allocation is efficient, in the sense that it corresponds 
to the choice of a planner who has access to lump-sum redistribution (or 
no distributional concern) but is subject to search frictions.
P r o p o s i t i o n  4  Assume v =  1. I f 0  =  (,, the laissez-faire allocation is 
efficient.
This Proposition establishes that the Hosios-Pissarides condition 
(see Pissarides, 1990) is necessary and sufficient for the laissez-faire out­
come to be efficient. The proof uses standard arguments and is, therefore, 
omitted. Extending the analysis to the case of risk aversion is possible, 
although more complicated.
4.3 C apital adjustm ents.
As we have seen (Proposition 1, part B), under constant returns to labor, 
reducing working time below the laisse-faire equilibrium results in lower 
employment. The same result holds if capital is allowed adjust when poli­
cies change, although returns to labor are diminishing. To analyze this 
case, we recover the original formulation V) =  A (Ar,/.1)Q K]~a and, for 
simplicity, consider a small open economy where capital is perfectly mo­
bile and there are no capital adjustment costs. Then, the representative 
firm’s optimal capital-labor ratio satisfies
In this case, the marginal product of labor is uniquely determined by the 
interest rate, i.e.,
(28)
Therefore, the equilibrium condition (20) becomes





























































































and the interest rate, r, uniquely determines the laissez-faire market 
tightness: Ou =  6{r).
P r o p o s i t i o n  5 I f Y  = A (N l)a A'1-Q and firms can costlessly adjust 
capital, then lr < lu => n(lr) < n(lu).
P r o o f .  The argument is the same as in the proof of Proposition 1. part B. Just 
notice that, Tir (6 ,lr ) =  ^ p (r )  — l x~l .
The employment effects of reducing working time are negative when 
capital is perfectly mobile, and there is no fixed factor of production, 
thus, no pure rents accrue to the firms. This finding suggests that at 
least part of the positive employment effects which may materialize in 
the short-run are likely to vanish as firms start adjusting their productive 
capacity.
5 C onstant E lasticity of Substitution.
In this section, we will consider preferences characterized by Constant 
Elasticity of Substitution (CES) between consumption and leisure. For­
mally, we assume:
ù(w ,(  1 -  l)) = ( f +  ^ ) ‘ i f  - o c < £ < l  and Ç ±  0; 
v/u»(l -  l) i f  Ç = 0
(30)
where is the elasticity of substitution between labor and leisure. 
Note that this specification encompasses Cobb-Douglas preferences, it =
y/ic(l — /), as the limit of ' when £ tends to zero.10
10Some technical remarks are in order, in this respect. First, the utility function 
(30) is not well-defined at (0,1) when $ < 0. However, it is easily proved that, in 
this case, lim{„_o,i—i}u(w, 1 — l) =  0. Using this fact, throughout the analysis, we 
will omit limits and. with some abuse of notation, write that u(0, 1) =  0 when $ < 0 . 
Second, observe that under the CES representation (30), u (0 ,1) = ^ when (  > 0. 




























































































5.1 Laissez-faire equilibrium .
Under CES utility, the First Order Conditions of the bargaining problem. 
(12) and (13), can be written as:
r ( w ,/ ,0
3u^
w (w4 + (1 — Z){)
(i - a )
pi — w + cO' (31)
r m  - o f(1 - l ) ( w i  +  ( ! - ! )« )
(1 -  8)p 
pi — w + cO'
where
r (w,z,0  = <
i
*/ ^ > o
i f  ? < 0 .
(32)
The two conditions jointly imply that w = p~ (1 — /). All points belong­
ing to the Pareto frontier of the bargaining set satisfy this restriction. In 
Figure 1, the Pareto frontier -  for a given p -  is represented as a neg­
atively sloped segment in the plane (w, l) (Figure 4). In contrast with 
the case of GHH preferences, the equilibrium working time depends on 
/?. The larger the power of workers, the higher the wage and the lower 
the number of hours. In the extreme case of 0  =  0, the solution features 
w = 0 and l = 1 (the workers receive their reservation utility), whereas 
in the opposite extreme of 0  — 1 workers work the minimum number of 
hours, Zmin, and earn the highest wage, w — wmax along the bargaining 
frontier.
outside option when bargaining with firms over wages and employment conditions, 
this discontinuous behavior will create some technical complications, which will be 





























































































Figure 4: Frontier of the bargaining set, CES utility.
Given the First Order Conditions, we proceed to derive the solu­
tions for wages and hours worked. It is, unfortunately, impossible to 
analytically characterize the case where the elasticity of substitution be­
tween consumption and leisure is larger than one (£ > 0). Quasi closed- 
form solutions can instead be derived when Ç < 0.11 In this case, the 
expressions for consumption and leisure are:
3 {p c6)
( -L-\ ’ (33)
P [  1
3(p + cd) (34)
1 -r p~~^t
To find the equilibrium employment level in this economy, plug in 
lu and wu into equation (4) and rearrange terms, to obtain:
p(l -  3) -  c [fr -r s)6*• + fiO] = 0. (35)
n The source of complication is the term T(«>,/,£). The case in which f  > 0 can be 




























































































Next, substitute n and l as given by (14) and (33), respectively, into the 
expression of the marginal product of labor. (5), to get:
p = aA
' ( l + s * - 1) >
1 4- p ^ 1 ( 1 — l3) — p ^  ctfO
(36)
(35)-(36) jointly determine the equilibrium solution with respect to the 
endogenous variables p,9. Once pand 9 are determined. (14)-(33)-(34) 
can be used to obtain solutions for the equilibrium employment, hours 
worked and wages.
5.2 E quilibrium  w ith  hours regulation .
Let us turn now to the bargaining problem with exogenous working time. 
The unique First Order Condition is given by (31), with the restriction 
that l — lr-
Using (4) to substitute away (plr—w), we can rewrite (31) as follows:
p(w ,lr)
( 1  ~  f3) w '  +  ( 1 -  l r ) (  ! _c 
13 r ( w , i , o  w
= c6 + (r + s)c(fi. (37)
Standard differentiation shows that, irrespective of parameters, p„, > 0, 
while the sign of the partial derivative p/ depends on the elasticity of 
substitution between consumption and leisure. In particular, it can be 
shown that £ ^  0 <=> pi ^  0.
Next, we use (5) and (14) to substitute away p and n, respectively, 
and rewrite the steady-state employment demand condition, (4), as:
w = aAl“ (s0f-1 +  l ) 1 a -  (r + s)c61'. (38)
The equilibrium is characterized by the pair of equation (37)-(38), where 
w and 6 are the endogenous variables. Figure 5 provides a geometrical 
representation of the equilibrium in the plane (w,6). Equation (37) is 
described by the upward sloping curve W W , while equation (38) is de­




























































































an exogenous increase in the hours worked by employee, lr ■ The increase 
in lT shifts the DD curve to the right, while its effect on the IITF curve 
depends on the sign of £. In particular, if £ < 0 (implying > 0). the 
in i"  curve shifts to the right, as in the case represented by Figure 5. If 
E > 0, however, (implying piT < 0), the H’fU curve shifts to the left. In 
the case of unit elasticity (E = 0), the UTU curve does not move. This 
simple geometrical argument establishes the following Proposition.
w
Figure 5: Equilibrium with restricted hours and effect of increasing 
hours (£ < 0).
P roposition  6 I f E < 0, then reducing working time necessarily de­
creases the steady-state employment level. IfE > 0, then reducing working 
time necessarily decreases the steady-state wage.
Under CES, this model yields the following prediction: unless con­
sumption and leisure are better substitutes than in Cobb-Dougals, re­
ductions of working time cannot increase employment. Note that when 
E < 0 , the effect of a reduction of hours on the total wage is ambiguous. If, 
however, £ < 0, reducing hours pushes down wages and possibly reduces 
unemployment. In this case, reducing hours originating from two oppo­




























































































(37)-(38) suggests that the range of parameters for which work-sharing 
has beneficial effects on aggregate employment when £ < 0 increases as 
we take larger a's. When a  is small, the DD  curve shifts only a little after 
a reduction in lT and the effect of the shift to the right of the 1111' curve 
dominates. The more diminishing the returns to labor, the larger the 
subset of the parameter space for which a reduction in hours promotes 
employment. Figure 6 represents a case in which consumption and leisure 
are substitutes, and a reduction in hours increases employment.
w
Figure 6: As case where a reduction of hours increase employment,
S >0 .
The intuition for the above result is the following. If consump­
tion and leisure are highly complementary, workers the marginal value of 
consumption becomes very high when workers have a greta deal of spare­
time. Thus, cutting hours only generates small (if any) wage reductions. 
The fixed cost effect on job creation then dominates, and employment de­
creases. The opposite occurs if workers regard consumption and leisure 
as sufficiently close substitutes. In this case, workers are prepared to 
substitute consumption for leisure. Wages decrease more significantly, 





























































































Analytically establishing the welfare implications of reducing hours 
under CES utility is more problematic. Although it can be shown that 
for a range of restrictions -  reducing working hours in a laissez-faire equi­
librium increases the instantaneous utility of employed workers, workers 
may suffer a loss due to increased unemployment . Nevertheless, our cal­
ibrations in section 6 will show that workers typically gain (while firms 
lose) from policies restricting working time. Thus, the distributional im­
plications are the same under both GHH and CES preferences.
6 Calibration.
In this section we provide the results of some numerical simulations, the 
aim of which is to provide a quantitative assessment of the importance 
of the effects identified in sections 4 and 5.
We calibrate the parameters as follows. We interpret a time period 
of unit length to be one quarter, and set the annual interest rate at 4.5%. 
The separation rate is fixed at s =  0.04, implying an average duration 
of a match of about six years. The bargaining strength parameter is 
set equal to 3  =  0.5 (symmetric Nash solution), and the elasticity of 
the matching function is £ =  0.5. Note that 3 = £ is the standard 
Hosios-Pissarides condition. The elasticity of output to labor, a, is set 
equal to 0.65, a standard value in both the growth and business cycle 
literature, where the output elasticity of labor is the competitive labor 
share. The two remaining parameters, c (the hiring cost) and A (the TFP 
in the production function), are calibrated so as to keep the steady-state 
unemployment rate to 8%, and l = 0.55 in the laissez-faire equilibrium 
across the different experiments. Also, to fix ideas, we assume that the 
l =  1 corresponds to 80 hours per week, implying that the laissez-faire 
solution yields 44 weekly working hours. Note that the average duration 




























































































6.1 G H H  preferences.
Following the studies of Greenwood et al. (1988) and Correia et al. 
(1995). based on micro-evidence, we assume the intertemporal elasticity 
of substitution in labor supply to be 0.6. i.e., we set \  - 1.7. We present 
the results for three different risk aversion parameters, ranging between 
the case of risk-neutrality (i/ =  1) and (almost) unit relative risk aversion 
(i/ =  10000). As mentioned before, given our extreme assumption about 
market incompleteness, the latter represents the upper bound to the 
effects of risk aversion in this model.
The results are summarized in Table 1. For each of the different 
cases analyzed, we report -  together with the parameters used- two series 
of statistics. The first column (Free) corresponds to  the equilibrium 
solution given unrestricted bargaining between firms over both wages 
and hours. The second column (Restr) corresponds to  the equilibrium 
solution under the assumption th a t the government imposes regulations 
on working time so as to  maximize the welfare of the employed. In 
the latter case (which will be referred to  as a labor-managed economy), 
workers and firms only bargain on wages. For each economy we report 
the solutions for the steady-state working time (l ). unemployment (u), 
wage (w), to tal hours (w ■ n) and output (y).





























































































The length of the working week maximizing workers’ utility is ap­
proximately 29 hours, corresponding to about two-thirds of the equi­
librium working time under unconstrained bargaining. The size of the 
differences between a  laissez-faire and a labor-managed economy changes 
with risk aversion, since this affects the wage response. In all cases, there 
is less unemployment in the labor-managed than in the laissez-faire econ­
omy, with the decrease in the unemployment rate ranging between 0.5 
and 0.9 points. Small employment effects imply tha t the total number 
of working hours in the economy is reduced by almost the full amount of 
the reduction in hours per worker. GDP (net of recruitment costs) falls 
by about a fourth .12
Figure 7 plots, respectively, the unemployment rate (u ), the welfare 
of the employed workers (IV), the welfare of the unemployed workers 
(U) and the firms’ profits (II) as functions of the number of hours (lr ) 
for the case where v = 5. The dashed line correponds to the laissez- 
faire equilibrium (44 hours). As discussed in section 4, the relationship 
between employment and working time is non-monotonic (top left panel), 
with employment being maximized for a working time level which is below 
the free-market agreement .Workers’ welfare is maximized a t lr =  29 (top 
right panel). Firm s’ profits, finally, increase motonically with working 
time (bottom right panel).
12lt may be interesting to check whether the relative size of the "recruitment costs” 
implied by these experiments is realistic. Recall that, since A and c are chosen to 
determine u and lu, recruitment costs are not calibrated to real observations. Under 
risk neutrality, each firm’s expenditure on recruitment is about 1.9% of the value of 
its gross GDP. In the other two cases (v — 5; v ~  103), this percentage increases to 
7% and 21%, respectively. Since recruitment costs in this model are meant to capture 
a variety of quasi-fixed cost, like training, etc., we think that both 1.9% and 7% are 




























































































B R A 0 (i/ =  1) 0.8 {v =  5)
©IIp
A 0.798 0.798 0.798
c 0.58 2.12 6.32
regime Free Restr Free Restr Free Restr
hours 44 29 44 29 44 29
un. rate 0.080 0.075 0.080 0.074 0.080 0.071
wage 0.348 0.261 0.312 0.222 0.213 0.105
total hours 40.5 26.8 40.5 26.9 40.5 26.9
GDP 0.503 0.382 0.477 0.354 0.406 0.270
Table 1. Simulations: GHH preferences.
An interesting experiment related to the ongoing policy debate in 
a number of European countries is to compare two regulated economies, 
with working weeks of 40 and 35 hours, respectively. We restrict our 
attention to  v  =  1 and v  =  5. As Table 2 shows, the differences in 
employment are very small. If we compare the predictions of our model 
with the empirical estimates of Hunt (1997), we find th a t one standard 
hour reduction causes a reduction of total hours of about 2.4%. which is 
in the range of H unt’s estimates. The employment elasticity predicted 
by our model are actually even smaller than th a t estimated by Hunt. 
A reduction of standard hours of 12.5% causes an employment increase 
of the order of 0.23%, with an implied elasticity of 0.02 (whereas Hunt 
estimated an elasticity of 0.1). Also, steady-state GDP falls by about 
9%, a rather large amount. Figure 7 shows, however, th a t workers are 
better off with 35 than with 40 hours. Note tha t the results would not 
change significantly if we considered economies with a  higher structural 
unemployment rate. If, for instance, we set parameters so that the un­
employment rate in the 40 hours economy is 11% (about the average 
unemployment rate in Continental Western Europe), the unemployment 




























































































R E A 0 (i/ =  1) 0.8 (v = 5)
A 0.798 0.798
c 0.58 2.12
hours 40 35 40 35
un. rate 0.078 0.076 0.077 0.075
wage 0.326 0.296 0.288 0.257
total hours 36.9 32.4 36.9 32.4
GDP 0.473 0.431 0.446 0.403
Table 2. From 40 to 35 hours.
6.2 CES preferences.
In the CES rase, we need to  parameterize the elasticity of substitution 
between consumption and leisure. We consider values of elasticities rang­
ing between 0.2 (£ =  —4). and 2 (£ =  0.5). The lower bound corre­
sponds to  the time series estimation of Alogoskoufis (1987a) with UK 
data. Cross-sectional analysis, in particular, finds tha t individuals earn­
ing higher hourly wages work more hours in the market than workers 
with low wages. This is consistent with consumption and leisure being 
substitutes rather than complements (as well as being consistent with 
GHH preferences). The elasticity of working hours to wages is estimated 
to be around 0.2 by Zabel (1993) using PSID, while earlier studies where 
direct and participation effects were compounded had found even large 
estimates of this elasticity. Since the existing evidence is mixed, we con­
sider a  wide range of elasticities.
elast. p 10 •An 11 1 0.5 ( £ = - l ) o •cn II 3 2.0 (f =  0.5)
A 1.18 1.16 1.2 1.53
c 3.80 3.70 3.85 0.553
case Free Restr Free Restr Free Restr Free Restr
i 44 32.9 44 32.6 44 34 44 30.4
u 0.080 0.110 0.080 0.097 0.080 0.087 0.080 0.076
w 0.447 0.385 0.440 0.365 0.451 0.379 0.682 0.531
y 0.758 0.613 0.746 0.606 0.767 0.649 0.984 0.775




























































































Table 3 summarizes the results. Coherently with the theoretical 
results of section 5. when f  <  0. the unemployment rate is higher in the 
labor managed than in the laissez-faire economy. The more complemen­
tary are consumption and leisure, the more negative are the employment 
effects of restrictions on working hours. W ith Cobb-Douglas preferences 
(£ =  0 ). for instance, the unemployment rate in the labor-managed econ­
omy is 0.7% higher than in the laissez-faire economy, while the difference 
increases to 3% when the elasticity is 0.2 (£ - —4). Yet. even when this 
causes higher unemployment, employed workers' welfare is maximized 
when a relatively large restriction on working time is imposed. Further­
more. the welfare of the unemployed is also increased by reducing working 
time. T hat is, the patterns described in Figure 7 generalize to  the CES 
case, even when £ <  0 (in Table 3) and unemployment increases.
The analysis showed that, when f  >  0. employment, effects are 
ambiguous. As is shown by the last two column in Table 3. when the 
elasticity of substitution equals 2 the solution resembles tha t under GHH 
preference. In particular, it turns out tha t unemployment is a U-shaped 
function of working time, decreasing a t the laissez-faire solution, lu. Un­
employment is lower in the labor managed than in the laissez-faire econ­
omy.
7 E x te n s io n s
To better understand the robustness of the results of Section 4. we will 
analyze in this section two extensions of our model. We show that the 
employment effects are also present when wages are collective bargained. 
In contrast, reducing standard hours when firms can use overtime may, 
in some cases, reduce employment.
7.1 C ollective  B argain ing
When wages and hours are bargained by a firm-level Union, instead of 




























































































the total surplus of the firm, rather than of the surplus generated by the 
marginal match. In this case, the general analysis becomes complicated, 
in particular, due to the firm’s outside option. W ith individual bargain­
ing. the firm’s outside option is, simply, the value of the marginal vacancy 
which, in equilibrium, equals zero. W ith collective bargaining, however, 
the firm’s outside option is the value of retaining the capital stock while 
having no employees, and with the perspective of hiring an entirely new 
workforce. The calculation of this outside option is quite complicated. In 
order to  keep the model tractable, we therefore introduce the simplifying 
assumption that, if negotiations break down, the firm is liquidated at a 
value equal to  a fraction 0 of the value of the firm (where 0 <  0 < l ).13
The bargaining problem is modified as follows (note th a t we express 
the problem in per worker terms):
max (n W  — nU )3 (11(1 — <f>))1 3 . 
fu’.O (39)
where 3 is the bargaining strength of the Union, and II =  A  (nl)a — 
wn — cs8^v =  (p i/a  — w — csQ*■) n. We only analyze the case of GHH 
preferences. The First Order Conditions are:
3 (r  +  s +  fl1-c) (1 - 3 ) r
(p l/a  — w — cs6^) ’ (40)
31*- 1 - / 3
" (® ~ x)
(p l/a  — w — cs ft) ■P, (41)
which, jointly, imply th a t in the laissez-faire environment, lu =  p W i, 
Thus, the presence of Unions does not alter the equality between the 
marginal product of labor and the marginal cost of effort. The main 
result of this section will be stated conditional on the following mild 
assumption.
13Alternatively, one could assume that the firm is liquidated at a constant value 
fl (e.g., capital is turned into consumption good) rather than a fraction of the value of 
the firm before the breakdown of the negotiations. The results are identical, although 




























































































This assumption is sufficient (not necessary) to guarantee that the 
equilibrium wage increases as the labor market becomes tighter (a natural 
feature of the equilibrium). Any economy with reasonable parameters 
satisfies this assumption .14 Under this condition, the main result of this 
section follows (see the Appendix for its proof).
P ro p o s itio n  7 I f  Assumption 7.1 is satisfied, then: (A ) I f  a < 1. then 
3f > 0 such that: 0 < lu — ls < e =$■ n (ls) > n{lu). (B) I f  a  =  1. then: 
0 < /„ - /* = * •  n(ls) < n(lu).
Proposition 7 extends the result of Proposition 1 to the case where 
Unions bargain for wages with firms on the workers’ behalf. Some range 
of reductions of working time, in the neighborhood of the laissez-faire 
solution, increase employment. It can also be shown th a t the other main 
results of Section 4 carry over unchanged to the case of collective bargain­
ing. In particular, starting from a laissez-faire equilibrium, all workers, 
both employed and unemployed, benefit from reducing working hours 
w'hen a < 1. whereas firms lose.
Assumption Parameters are such that n > \ / r  +  ,s (y/r + s — v's) jr.
7.2 O vertim e
So far, we have restricted our attention to an extreme form of regula­
tion, where an employee can only work a given number of hours as set 
by the legislation. It is common practice, however, to  allow overtime, 
although firms are. in many countries, subject to pecuniary penalties as 
well as various types of constraints on their use. In this section we extend 
the model to  introduce this feature. We assume th a t firms can employ 
workers for longer tim e than statu tory  hours, but must pay an extra-cost, 
proportional to  the number of extra hours employed. Workers and firms 
bargain on wages and hours subject to  such regulations. We define r  as
14For instance, if s =  0.04 as in our simulations. Assumption 7.1 is satisfied for any 




























































































the fee paid bv the firm on each extra hour of work and to as the normal 
hourly wage. We still denote statu tory  hours by Zr , but, in this rase, the 
actual working time needs not be equal to Zr .15 For simplicity, we only 
study the case of GHH preferences.
The profit maximization problem of a representative firm is modi­
fied as follows.
n, = J  e~r‘ (.4 ( \ , l , ) a -  [wl + ~ (l — Zr)j N, -  C0' (.V + s.v )) dt.
(42)
subject to (1). and given A'o. Solving this problem and restricting atten­
tion to  steady-state (we let, as usual, N, = n), we obtain:
pi — (iu + t )1 -I- rlr -  c(r +  s)0c =  0 (43)
where, p is the marginal product of labor as defined in equation (5).
We first, consider the case where the additional casts suffered by 
firms are transferred to the workers as a premium on the extraordinary 
hours worked. This implies that the total wage of an individual worker 
can be decomposed into two parts: wl. which defines the normal compen­
sation, and t (1 — l0) which defines the premium for extraordinary hours. 
Workers and firms are assumed to  bargain w and l. taking r  and l0 as 
given. However, since agents, when bargaining, understand tha t only 
total payments m atter, the following neutrality result follows (it is also 
proved in the Appendix):
P ro p o s itio n  8 I f  the fees paid by firms on overtime are transferred to 
the workers as extra compensation, then the equilibrium solution is iden­
tical to the laissez-faire equilibrium, irrespective o f r  and lr .
l0The choice of modeling the extra cost as an absolute fee. r, on each extraordinary 
hour worked, rather than, more realistically, as a percentage of the normal hourly wage 
is motivated by tractability. No major result would change in the alternative set-up, 
but it becomes impossible to obtain closed-form solutions. The choice of having hourly 
rather than total wages is instead purely expositional. The results would be identical 




























































































In many countries -  see the recent proposal of 35 hours regulation 
in Italy, for instance -  firms must pay additional sunk costs which are 
not transferred to the workers (e.g. higher taxes) for the use of extra 
hours of work. In this case, regulations have real effects, as will now 
be shown. W hen workers only receive the normal wage, although firms 
must pay fees on extra hours, the FOC's of the bargaining problem (cfr. 
(16)-(17)) become -  restricting attention to  interior solutions where a 
positive number of extraordinary hours are worked - :
3
v (w l -
( 1 - 3 )
p i  — wl — T  (l — lr ) +  c8' (44)
v
(w -l* - ') 1 - / 3
pi — wl — t  (l — lr ) + c8
(p -  w - t ) . (45)
Hence,
r  — Max[(p — t )* -1 , Ir] (46)
tIs'l" = ( ^ " 7 ^  +  (P -  r ) '^ 1 +  3 ( c8 + t It )  ̂ i f  r  > lr-
( l - 0 ) v ‘±  + g (p lr + c0)] i f  l’ =  lT.
(47)
where 7 is as defined as in section 4. Consider the range of interior 
solutions, where /* >  lT. Substituting the values of l* and ic 'into (43), 
and rearranging terms, we obtain:
A (p. 8, lr, t ) = 71/ ( 1-/? ) ( p - r ) x +  Tlr —c [(r -t- s)81' + ;?7#] =  0 , 
(48)
where standard differentiation shows that. Ap >  0, A» <  0, Alr > 0 and 




























































































Figure 8 : Equilibrium with overtime.
Next, substitute n and l as given by (14) and (46) into the expres­
sion of the marginal product of labor, (5) (in the case when Z* > Zr ) to 
obtain:
T (p. 8, t ) =  p  -  a A  (1 +  s6< 1) 1 “ (p -  t)* ^  =  0, (49)
where Tp >  0, T» > 0, Tr <  0. (48)-(49) determine the equilibrium 
solution with respect to  the endogenous variables p, 6. The effects of legal 
restrictions on hours can be seen by looking at Figure 8 . The positively 
sloped curve, BB. represents equation (48), while the negatively sloped 
curve. AA, represents equation (49). Consider the (steady-state) effect of 
increasing statu tory  hours, while keeping r  fixed. Since Air > 0 (while T 
is independent of Zr ), increasing Zr shifts the BB curve to the right, while 
the AA curve remains unchanged. Thus, it increases 9 and decreases p. 
Therefore, an increase of statu tory  hours -  when overtime is allowed and 
in the range where it is used -  always reduces unemployment. Reducing 
statu tory  hours, on the other hand, increases unemployment in the same 
case.
Consider, now, the effect of changes in r . Since < 0 and AT <  0, 




























































































right, with ambiguous effects on 8 and employment. Nevertheless, an 
interesting local result can be established. Consider an economy where 
-  for given lr -  fees are sufficiently high to deter firms from using extra 
hours, i.e., T  =  lr . Then, decrease progressively r  to the level where 
firms start using overtime. At this level of taxes, we know that /* =  lr, 
hence AT =  —71/(1 — /?)(/ — lT) =  0. Therefore, the BB curve does not 
move, while the AA curve shifts to the left, causing a fall in 9. More 
in general, starting from sufficiently large values of t , increaseas in the 
price of overtime cause unemployment to fall.
The main results of this section are summarized by the following 
Proposition.
P ro p o s itio n  9 (A ) Let (t ° ,1 °) be such that / '  > 1°. Then, keeping r°  
constant, Jp >  0. (B) For any given lr , there exists f  <  00 such that 
Vr >  f , ^  >  0 (with >  fo r  some r  > f ) .
Proposition 9 has interesting normative implications. If the gov­
ernment wants to  restrict working time with the objective of promoting 
employment, it should discourage the use of extraordinary hours either 
by legislation or by enforcing severe fees, bu t not by decreasing the num­
ber of statu tory  hours while keeping penalties on the use of extra hours 
moderate.
8 Conclusions.
There is widespread agreement th a t the high level and persistency of un­
employment is the main current economic and social problem in Europe. 
There is, however, much less agreement on which policies European gov­
ernments should follow to increase employment. This disagreement often 
reflects, more or less openly, the fact tha t employment policies usually 
have redistributional effects. The proposal of reducing working time is 
one of these policies th a t generates controversy. This is not surprising, 





























































































Two aspects have been discussed in the paper. One is based on 
purely redistributional grounds. We find that almost independently of 
whether there is “work sharing” or not. workers may prefer regulation 
restricting working time. The other is about, whether restricting working 
time can be effective in increasing employment. As a positive conclusion, 
our theory suggests that there may be nothing irrational behind the 
fact that, when the balance of political equilibrium shifts in favor of the 
workers (as it seems to  have been recently the case in several European 
countries), the old call for reducing working time by decree emerges again. 
It is a different m atter, however, to assess whether the policy will mitigate 
the European unemployment problem. To this respect, our paper broadly 
agrees with the past literature, both theoretical (Calmfors. 1985: Hoel 
and Vale. 1986. etc. ) and empirical (Hunt, 1997) in calling for caution. 
The conditions for obtaining even small employment effects are rather 
restrictive. In particular, input factors -such as, capital in our model - 
should not be able to  adjust to the policy intervention (this might explain, 
why some proponents would like these policies to  be implemented at the 
largest scale possible, e.g.. the EU). Moreover, the output loss which this 
policy would cause may be quite large. Although we have not addressed 
this issue explicitly, one expects that reducing working time will have a 
negative impact on the government budget of the countries which choose 
to adopt this policy.
Several im portant aspects and extensions are left open for future 
research. For example, we have only discussed wage setting through 
bargaining, but not other regimes, such as “wage posting.” Similarly, 
we have not considered other mechanisms tha t may rationalize “working 
time regulations.” Our model does not consider possible “social coor­
dination” problems, nor the possibility th a t workers like restrictions on 
working time to avoid that, employers exploit some type of yardstick com­
petition mechanism to induce them to overwork. Nor do we consider the 
possible role of downward nominal rigidities, implying tha t total wages 
adjusting with a delay to the reduction of hours. In this case, the short- 
run employment effects of the policy may be worse than those predicted 




























































































regarding our assumptions, one can generalize the model in different di­
rections. For example, by introducing heterogeneity among workers or by 
not having hours and workers as perfect substitutes. Alt hough import ant 
for a more accurate quantitative assessment of the policy, most of these 
generalizations are unlikely to substantially change our main results.
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P ro p o s itio n  7
P ro o f. In the economy with regulation, the first order condition is given 
by (40) under the constraint that I =  lr . By inserting the labor demand 
condition, (4). into (40). we obtain:
J ( r  +  .s +  tf1-s )  ( l - d ) r
■y ( « , - £ )  (rc0<+plr^ )
(cfr. the individual bargaining condition. (16)). Since (4) implies c8' =
r+7S% ■then wages are eiven b>'
= 7((1 - 3 ) -  +  3(p/r +  c0) +  3X (r  +  s + pi ' - T r ) (51)
The expression (51) differs from the expression for individual bargain­
ing wages (22) by the presence of the last positive term on the right 
hand-side (since workers also share the rents generated bv inframarginal 
workers, their wage, given 3. is higher). By substituting (51) into the 
labor demand equation we obtain:
(1 -37 )
(  l? \  r — , 3(r  +  s + 9X '•) l - o( p/r -  —J  — c [3~i8 +  (r -f  s)8'] +  7 —------------------plr------- .
(52)
>From (52). recalling th a t n =  (1 +  s8'' ')  , it follows that f ( n . lT) = 0.
where:
f(6,lr) = (1 -  37) (*A  (1 + 0  -  c [37# + (r + s)^]5»)
~ ( r + s + fl1̂ )  (1 + s ^ - l)(1-a) ,41“(1 -  a).
Then. ^  To sign the effect of a  change of lT. we proceed to
sign each of the partial derivatives. First., by the same argument used in 
the proof of Proposition 1,




























































































is negative, provided that lr <  lu. In order to determine the sign of 
Toll). lT). observe that (i) the term (1 — J t )  ^a.4 (1 +  s# '-1 ) 1 ° I? — ^  -
c(r-t-s)0s is decreasing with O'. (ii) the term  (r-t-s-t-01-' )  (1 +  s(b_1) 1 “ 
is increasing with 0 if and only if (1 — a ). This condition
holds true necessarily if Assumption 7.1 is satisfied (observe that d1-'  = 
s / ( l  — n)). QED
P ro p o s itio n  8
P ro o f. The value of a filled job for a worker and a firm are, respectively:
(r  +  s)W' =  u (wl +  r  (/ -  lr) , (1 — l)) +  sU. (54)
and:
(r +  s )J  = pi -  wl -  t (1 — lr) (55)
Then, solving the bargaining problem yields the following FOC’s
(1 -0 )
, ( ù l  +  T ( /  -  Ir ) -  P 1 ~  Æ’( 1 +  +  * T t'  ' ■c9'
(56)
V (w l + T  (l — lT) — 
whose solution is:
(w +  r  -  /x~‘)
/* =  px
1 - 3
(P ■pi — w{l + t )1 +  wrlT +  c6
(57)
(58)
w‘ =  wl + T (l — lr) =  7 ( (1 3)l/ +  a) p *  +  3c9
LV x )
(59)
where 7 is as defined in section (4). Since w’ = wu (as given by (19)) 
and l’ =  lu (as given by (18) ), the result is established. Q E D .
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